

*A Vindication of the Author of the Right of the Archbishop to Continue, &c. from some little Exceptions lately taken by the Writer of Two Letters concerning the Choice of Members, &c.*

**W**HAT this Writer pretends to cite from the *Right of the Archbishop, &c.* is one continu'd Misrepresentation; the Occasion, Design, and Extent of the Words, as they stand in that Book, being widely different from the Purpose for which he produces them. The Passage, p. 115. is this: *If the Prince be inclin'd to such Intermissions [of Convocation-business] he need not the Assistance of the Archbishop's Power of Adjourning, when his own Proroguing or Not-Summoning will do it as legally and more effectually.* This Writer says, They are brought by way of Answer to an Objection, That the Archbishop's Adjourning-Power may enable the Prince to suppress Convocations: When he could not but see in the very Page to which he refers, how the Author's Plea is, that the Power of Adjourning can at most but suspend Convocation-business for the present; the Laws already made (under which the Church has so long flourish'd,) being no way affected by it: And this was a proper Reply to those Suggestions of the two Books he was answering, That this Power in the Archbishop enables him to void the Privileges of this National Church, and alter or destroy the Ecclesiastical Constitution. Frightful Words! made use of only to terrify and amuse unwary Readers.

To invalidate the Objection yet farther, the Author of the *Right, &c.* adds, that this Power does not absolutely enable the Archbishop even to suspend Convocation-business, because the Prince has a right to require the consideration of such particular Matters as he shall see cause to recommend: Or, *if the Prince also be inclin'd to such Intermissions, he need not the Assistance of the Archbishop's Power of Adjourning, when his own Proroguing or Not-Summoning will do it as legally and more effectually.* Which Argument is directly to the purpose; except this Writer will either deny, that the King cannot Prorogue and Not-summon a Convocation, or say that these do not suspend Convocation-business. But, (says he, p. 9.) the last Advocate, meaning the Author I am now defending, roundly affirms, that the King may LEGALLY NOT SUMMON a Convocation, when he summons a Parliament. Whereas, that Advocate says not, directly or indirectly, one word about a Parliament; but argues only to

this effect, That any Prince who shall desire to have the business of Convocation suspended, may do it as well without as with the Archbishop's Power of Adjourning, because it is in his own power, for a time, not to summon either Parliament or Convocation, and also to Prorogue both as he sees occasion. This is all that the Argument requir'd, and all that could be intended by the Author; who is so far from interposing in the Dispute about the concurrent Meetings of Parliament and Convocation, that he plainly avoids it, and refers the Decision to the Persons under whose consideration it remains, in these plain words, *How far they [the Clergy] have a right in Law to be summoned with every Parliament, is a Question still depending.* The words are in the 131 pag. of that Book, and, had they not been conceal'd by the Censurer of it, would have sufficiently confuted his unfair Interpretation of the other Passage. But 'tis so hard to convince Men, of any Advantage arising from the Execution of his *Præmunientes*-Clause, that he is forc'd to set his Invention a-work for imaginary Fears and Dangers of any kind; and then applies the Clause he contends for, by way of Remedy, that it may seem at least not to be wholly useless.

But, in the present case, it could be no Remedy, supposing a real Danger to require it. With the utmost Authority this Writer can give the *Præmunientes*, it could only bring the Clergy together, with the Parliament; which, ever since the Triennial Act, 'tis in the King's Power not to summon for the greatest part of three Years; and all that while, by consequence, in his Power also to suspend Convocation-business, without the least Assistance from the Archbishop. And when these two Bodies are come together, and the Meetings held, the Act lays no Restraint upon the King's Proroguing-Power; which is as much to our present Point (i. e. suspends Convocation-business as much) as the Not-summoning could do. For, I can hardly think that this Writer, however he have made Advances of other kinds towards giving the Lower-house the appearance of a Presbyterian-Assembly, would yet imitate and even surpass a neighbouring Nation in that farther Claim, of sitting and acting as long as they please, in defiance of His Majesty's Prorogation or Dissolution.



And yet no Man knows, to what extravagant degrees the Claims of *Exemptions* and *Independences* may rise, if indulg'd or conniv'd at in the beginning. Those of the Lower-house, the last Convocation, were going on apace in that way, and every Step by which they were to mount higher, was of course to bring their *Metropolitan* and *Bishops* so much lower. It was therefore time for the Friends of *Episcopacy* to interpose; as did the Author of that Book, (*wheresoever*, or by *whomsoever* drawn up,) with a dutiful Endeavour to protect the just Rights of his Ecclesiastical Superiours, and thereby the Constitution of our Episcopal-Church, against all such *Approaches* to *Presbytery*: And it had been early enough for this warm Writer to pronounce the Claims of the Archbishop *Exorbitant*, after he had seen the late Vindication of them fairly confuted, and his Grace or his Brethren prov'd to insist upon any Rights *now*, that have not been ever enjoy'd and exercis'd by their Predecessors.

II. If he had not resolv'd to overlook every thing that lay in the way of his own Schemes, he could never have rais'd that little Cavil about the Archbishop's *SOLE POWER* of Continuing; after the Vindicator of his Grace's Right, (p. 121, 122.) had so clearly explain'd himself upon that Head, shewing, that the Archbishop's Continuing *with*, or *without*, the Consent of his Brethren, has not the least Influence upon the Dispute with the *Lower-house*: which made it plain enough that the sole power of his Grace could only be meant to exclude the *Lower-House*, and to deny that they have any part in Continuations. It was, I confess, artful enough in the Writers of that side to start such a Nicety, in hopes it might improve into a *Dispute* and *Difference* in the Upper-house; but God be thank'd it has had no such Effect there: On the contrary, their Lordships, sensible of the *design* and *tendency* of these Proceedings, the more vehement opposition they meet with, seem to unite the closer in the common defence of the *Rights* and *Authority* of their Order.

III. Having vindicated the Author of the *Right of the Archbishop, &c.* from the Misrepresentations of this Letter, I must go on to do him justice against the malicious Suggestions of a late Additional Paper upon the Subject; and that, in a point of more tender concern, his *Integrity*.

It is well known, how the Advocate for the *Power of the Lower-House* to adjourn it self, cited a Clause from the Archiepiscopal Mandate, requiring the Proctors of the Cathedral and Diocesan Clergy to come up with Powers to Consent to Continuations; and how Dr. Kennet, who had cited the Mandate *without* that Clause, was reprov'd by the same hand, and told that it was to be seen

in *Several Forms* of that Mandate.

The Reply made to this by the Author of the *Right of the Archbishop*, is drawn from a Variety of Mandates in several Ages, recorded in the Registers of the Archiepiscopal See. Which Mandates, no fewer than *Seventy* in number, were distinctly view'd by a Publick Notary, and nothing of that Clause appear'd in any of them. Whereupon, an *Attestation* thereof was made under the Notary's Hand; and being Publish'd at the beginning of that Book, is as Clear an Evidence as can be desir'd, both that these words could be no proper part of the Mandate, and that Dr. Kennet's Citation of it was fair and ingenuous.

But the Writer of this *Second Letter* (which seems to have been sent abroad in great Haste and Confusion, to prevent the Shame that he saw coming upon him from a Misrepresentation in the first, more gross than that of the Mandate) endeavours to make the World believe, That in the very Registers of the Archbishop, to which this Attestation refers, there is more than one Mandate with this very Clause in it: that there is also ground to believe, that the Editor of the Book was not wholly a Stranger to them at the moment he publish'd Mr. Tyllott's Attestation; and that 'tis Certain, that he hath since been convinc'd in this respect, and yet suffer'd that Attestation to impose upon the World now for six Weeks together.

The plain tendency of this Charge, is, to raise a Suspicion at least, that there is one or more Mandates with that Clause in the Registers of the Archbishop; and that these were conceal'd from the Notary, when he view'd the seventy that have it not. If this was so, it must be own'd a very disingenuous Part in the Doer; but if not, highly injurious and unchristian in the Accuser.

The Author of the *Right of the Archbishop, &c.* in Vindication of his own Integrity, affirms upon the word of a Christian, as follows:

1. That he neither knows nor believes, that there is, or ever was, in the Archbishop's Registers any one Mandate with that Clause, or with any words to that effect.

2. That when the Attestation was publish'd, he did not know or believe that there was any where else more than one Form of a Mandate with such a Clause; of which one he there speaks, as hap'ning upon a remarkable Contest between the *Metropolitain* and *Legatin* Authority; and affirms that a particular account thereof was then undertaken by another hand, and the part relating to this Mandate was Printed-off at least a Month ago. 8 H 6 1 cap 33 N 1

3. That he continu'd to believe, that there never was more than one such Form of an Archiepiscopal Mandate, till very lately he was told of another.



ther. Which being accounted for upon the self-same Contest between the *Metropolitan* and *Legat*, can have no influence upon the present Cause; and making the number but *two* in all, is far from justifying the *first* Assertion, that there are *Several* in that very form; and lastly, not being in the Registers of the Archbishop does no way affect or invalidate the foresaid *Attestation*.

This is fair and open dealing; not like the Accuser's Evasive way, who according to the crafty method of the worst sort of Slanderers, would insinuate into others the belief of what he himself dare not affirm. He will not say, that there is *one* or *more* Mandates of that sort in the Registers of the Archbishop, nor that he himself *believes* it: when yet, had he suspected their being there, he might easily have made himself, or a Friend, an *Eye-witness* of it: And I appeal to the world, whether by all the rules of Justice and Conscience he ought not to have made that Examination before he undertook to disperse these Malicious *Suggestions*; and whether his declining to make it, be not an evident mark of his *Conviction*, or his *fear* at least, that he should not meet with any such Mandates there.

This appears in his very *manner* of expressing the

Charge: he would not say directly, that these things really are as he insinuates, because there would be an easy way to confute him; but he asks his Friend, *Would you believe that in the very Registers of the Archbishop there should be more than one Mandate with this very Clause in it?* — And, *Fame* says, that such Mandates there are in those very Registers. It is an art that some Men have got, first to spread a Fame and then to quote it. But, I hope, that Author will not expect to have it thought, that in a matter so immediately affecting his Integrity, he would have rested in common *Fame*, or spar'd his Adversary, and suffer'd the Scandal to lay upon himself ever since the publication of that Book, had he imagin'd that any thing in those Registers would have contributed to his Defence. If he were to be call'd to a clear and open Declaration, whether himself really believ'd what he insinuated, I am apt to think it would be a difficulty upon him. However, the person who is injur'd in this case, entirely conscious of his own Integrity, challenges him to make good the charge; and in default thereof, thinks he has a right to expect a publick *Reparation* that may reach as far as the Slander has done.

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